Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction by Vareda, João
Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in
Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
João Vareda
School of Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboay
Autoridade da Concorrênciaz
November, 2007
Abstract
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through unbundling of the local loop. We 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1 Introduction
Unbundling and investment. In the last 10 years, mandatory unbundling
has become a standard remedy proposal for solving the bottleneck problem
in xed telecoms competition. Since there are high entry barriers in the
telecommunications market, because of scale economies, sunk costs and rst-
mover advantages, it is hard for a new operator to enter the market as a
full-facility competitor. In particular, the building of local access networks,
which are composed of circuits connecting end users to switches located in
central o¢ ces, requires large investments in terms of money and time.
Under mandatory unbundling an incumbent rm has to share the use of
some of its facilities with its competitors. This implies that an essential input
is, at the wholesale level, separated from the incumbents overall facilities, in
order to allow for commercial wholesale supply of this input. In the particular
case of local loop unbundling, this means that a new operator can directly
plug into the incumbents network by creating a connection from its switch
to the incumbents local access network.
This policy is promoted both in the United States since the 1996 Telecom-
munications Act and in the European Union since the 1998 liberalization, and
is supposed to generate entry in the market, and to encourage entrants to
build their own network in the future when their stock of costumers is large
enough.
Service-based competition promoted by unbundling has, however, been
criticized on the basis that it only promotes static e¢ ciency. The main
argument is that incumbents would not have incentives to invest if they had to
share the benets of their investments with rivals. Moreover, if access to the
incumbentsnetwork was allowed too easily, this would create ine¢ ciencies
in the long run since an entrant would not have incentives to build competing
facilities (see Jorde et al., 2000).
Partially as a response to these arguments, several empirical studies ana-
lyzing the e¤ect of unbundling on incumbent rmsinvestment have emerged.
For instance, Willig et al. (2002) examine the relationship between un-
bundling prices and Bell companiesinvestments, and conclude that lower un-
bundling prices stimulate incumbentsinvestment, supporting a competitive
stimulus hypothesis, according to which a low unbundling price encourages
entry, and this increased competition strengths the incumbentsincentive to
invest. A study by Hassett et al. (2003) obtains similar conclusions.
However, these results are not without controversy. Haring et al. (2002)
criticize Willigs estimation methodology and develop their own econometric
model. They obtain the opposite relationship, i.e. low unbundling prices
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reduce the protability of incumbentsinvestment leading to a reduction in
that investment. Hausman and Sidak (2005) corroborate this opinion in their
case study about the unbundling experience in the US, New Zealand, Canada,
United Kingdom, and Germany. Gabel and Huangs (2003) econometric
results indicate that in the US the higher the unbundling price, the more
likely is the introduction of new services by the incumbents. Ingraham and
Sidak (2003) show that mandatory unbundling increases the volatility of the
incumbentsstock returns, which increases their equity cost.
In 2003 a new controversy has emerged after the publication of the Phoenix
Center Policy Bulletin no5 which shows that the rise in unbundling lines has
increased investment by incumbents. This gave origin to two replies, one by
Hazlett et al. (2003) on behalf of Verizon, and another by Hill (2003) on be-
half of Z-Tell-Communications, both contesting the empirical estimation and
arguing that the rise in unbundling lines has led to a decline in incumbents
investment. As a response, the Phoenix Center published its Policy Bulletin
no6 which, by incorporating the comments of the two replies, shows that its
previous result was robust.
Finally, there is also a study by Chang et al. (2003) that nds, using US
data, that lower access prices have spurred investment by incumbents. Even
so, the same study points in the opposite direction for Europe.
We can conclude that there is an unresolved controversy about the true
e¤ect of unbundling in incumbentsinvestment and, following from this, what
the regulated unbundling price should be.
Model and results. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model with
two operators, an incumbent and an entrant, that compete in subscription
prices. The entrant can only compete with the incumbent if it has access
to its local loop, for which it must pay an unbundling price. Our model
supposes partial consumer participation, therefore it portrays non-mature
markets, such as the broadband market. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) as-
sume full consumer participation represented by a Hotelling model. In this
model prots are insensitive to the unbundling price for a large interval of
unbundling prices, which does not seem to be reasonable in the context of
investment choice.
The main contribution of our model is the comparison of the incumbents
incentives for two di¤erent types of investment, quality-upgrades and cost-
reduction, when the regulator sets the unbundling price before investment.
We show that, although these investments are complements, the direct e¤ect
of the unbundling price on each one di¤ers. Indeed, a lower unbundling price
decreases incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost
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reduction. This follows from the fact that, for a lower unbundling price, the
incumbent wants to maintain its competitive advantage. Thus, it has more
incentives to invest in cost reduction. On the other hand, it has less incen-
tives to invest in quality upgrades because this benets both operators. In
equilibrium, we have a higher investment in cost reduction for a lower un-
bundling price, while investment in quality can be higher or lower depending
on the strength of the complementarity e¤ect.
Given this, we determine the socially optimal unbundling price, and show
that when the regulator is able to commit to the unbundling price he should
set a lower (higher) price when cost reduction is relatively less (more) expen-
sive than quality upgrades.
Next, we analyze a context where the regulator cannot commit to his de-
cisions and revises the unbundling price after the investment has been made.
In this case, the incumbent does not invest since the regulator sets a price
such that it earns zero prots gross of investment. Here unbundling crowds
out investment, and thus social welfare is lower than in the commitment
context.
Then, we compare the two scenarios with an unregulated market. We
show that the incumbent has incentives to unbundle its infrastructure in
order to attract new consumers to the market. This is always worse than the
context where the regulator sets the unbundling price before investment as
the price set by the incumbent is too high, but it can be better than a no-
commitment context since there is some investment. Therefore, we conclude
that the unbundling problem raised by some authors is more a problem of
commitment rather than unbundling as such.
Finally, we consider two extensions to our model. First, we briey analyze
the case of imperfect commitment, i.e. a context where the regulator is able
to commit with a probability lower than 1, and argue that results are similar
to the commitment context, although the incumbent has weaker incentives
to invest. As a second extension, we provide a short analysis of the case of
mature markets. In these markets, investment in quality upgrades increases
with the unbundling price, while investment in cost reduction is independent
of it. Thus, with full consumer participation we nd a positive relationship
between total investment and the unbundling price.
Related literature. In contrast with the large amount of research on
static access pricing, the dynamic study of optimal access pricing is still in its
early stages. Valletti (2003) reviews the static access pricing literature, and
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provides a discussion about the linkage between access pricing and invest-
ment incentives by relating them with questions common to R&D. Guthrie
(2006) provides a survey over the recent literature on the relationship be-
tween infrastructure investment and the di¤erent regulatory regimes.
Foros (2004) shows that under some conditions the investment level in
quality is lower with price regulation since the access price is set equal to
marginal cost. Kotakorpi (2006) considers a similar model with vertical dif-
ferentiation, and obtains similar results. Cambini and Valletti (2004) study
the impact of access charges on the incentives to invest in quality, but in a
context of two-way access. They derive the result that rms would choose
an access price above marginal cost in order to diminish each others incen-
tive to invest. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) consider the possibility of quality
upgrades by the incumbent in an unregulated context, and when the entrant
can invest in its own network, and show that the incumbent not always nds
it protable to invest. Vareda and Hoernig (2007) study the investment of
two operators in a new infrastructure which allows them to o¤er new services.
In addition, there are some papers that consider cost-reducing invest-
ments, as Biglaiser and Ma (1999), Cabral and Riordan (1989) and Sapping-
ton (2002), the rst in a context of an incumbent rm and the other two in
monopoly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
model in Section 2, and in Section 3 we obtain the equilibrium prices and
quantities. In Section 4 and 5 we solve the investment and regulation stage
when the regulator can commit to the unbundling price, and when he cannot,
respectively. In Section 6 we nd the unregulated market equilibrium, and
in Section 7 we consider some extensions. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude.
2 The Model
We introduce a model of a telecommunications market, where two rms com-
pete on subscription prices. The operators on this market are: one vertically
integrated network (denoted as incumbent) which owns the local loop, and
one non-integrated network (denoted as entrant) which only owns a back-
bone and switches, and needs access to the incumbents local loop so that it
can be able to compete.1
We introduce a third party, the regulator, who sets the local loop access
price, which we will designate as unbundling price, in order to maximize
1Our results can also be applied to situations where the entrant has access to more
unbundled elements of the incumbents network, and not only to the local loop.
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social welfare. We assume that the unbundling price is the only instrument
available for the regulator. This corresponds closely to the current European
practice. Furthermore, we adopt the simplifying assumption of complete
information, i.e. the regulator is supposed to have full information about the
incumbents technology and costs.
We assume that the incumbent can invest in its infrastructure both to
increase quality and to reduce cost, and that there is no uncertainty about
returns on investment.
After observing the price set by the regulator and the investment made
by the incumbent, the entrant decides if it asks for access to the local loop.
In this paper we exclude the possibility of entering as a facility-based com-
petitor.
Demand side
Contrary to the Hotelling model often used in the literature, in our paper
we assume partial consumer participation, which means that there is always
some consumers who will not buy. This creates the opportunity to consider
welfare e¤ects neglected by the former model and makes prots depend on the
unbundling price. We will then work with the following aggregate demand
functions due to Bowley (1924):2
qI =
a (1  )  pI + pE
b
 
1  2 (1)
qE =
a (1  )  pE + pI
b
 
1  2 (2)
where (qi; pi) are the number of subscribers and the subscription price of
operator i; with i = I for the incumbent and i = E for the entrant. Parameter
a corresponds to the reservation price, and  2 (0; 1) indicates the degree of
substitutability between the services o¤ered by the two operators. The higher
is , the stronger is the substitutability. For simplicity, we normalize b = 1:
These demand functions can be derived by aggregation from a standard
individual consumer model of vertical product di¤erentiation with discrete
choice: There are two groups of consumers, with one regarding the incum-
bents product as being of higher quality, and the other regarding the en-
trants product as being of higher quality. Consumers are uniformly distrib-
uted along an interval [0; 1] with a willingness to pay for quality that declines
as they move from 0 to 1 (see Martin, 2002, p.81). Indeed, in a telecommuni-
cations market, consumers usually subscribe services from only one operator,
2This model of aggregate demand functions for di¤erentiated products is widely used
in the industrial organization literature (see Spence, 1976, for an example).
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thereby, they face a discrete decision problem of which operator to subscribe
to.
The consumer surplus arising from aggregating the individual indirect
utilities is of the form:
CS =
a2
1 + 
+M +
p2I + p
2
E
2
 
1  2   a (pI + pE)1 +    pIpE1  2 ; (3)
where M is the numeraire good.3
Note that by assuming that reservation prices are equal to both operators
we are restricting the consumers of one group to regard the quality of oper-
ators (the preferred and the least preferred one) the same way as the other
group regards. This assumption is made for analytical convenience, however,
qualitatively results do not depend on it (at least until the di¤erence between
reservation prices is not too big).
Supply side
Regarding the incumbents cost structure, we assume that cost per sub-
scriber is just a constant marginal cost c. For simplicity, irrespective of being
the incumbent or the entrant that sells the services to subscribers, we assume
the incumbents marginal cost per subscriber to be the same, and lower than
the reservation price.
If the entrant decides to ask for access to the incumbents local loop, the
incumbent receives from the entrant the unbundling price r per consumer.
For its own retail services it receives a subscription price pI per consumer.
Given these, in the absence of investment, the incumbents prot is:
I = (pI   c) qI + (r   c) qE: (4)
The entrant receives a subscription price pE from its customers and pays
the correspondent unbundling price to the incumbent. Hence, its prot is:
E = (pE   r) qE: (5)
We assume that rms only operate in the market if they have non-negative
prots:
I  0 ; E  0: (6)
As we are not considering in our model questions related with foreclosure,
we assume that the entrant has already incurred in the sunk cost of entry.
Thus, it asks for access if it is able to obtain non-negative retail prots.
3In the following we will consider that M = 0 for simplicity.
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Investments
We will consider that the incumbent can make two types of investment:
quality-upgrades and cost reduction.
In the rst case, we assume that the investment increases the reservation
price by g, which implies a parallel shift in both demand functions. In fact,
as the entrant supplies its services through the incumbents local network, it
also benets from this investment, consequently, the reservation price for its
services also increases in g. We assume that spillovers are complete, contrary
to Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006).4 An example of this kind of investment
is an upgrade of the switching equipment or the installation of new bre optic
cables, which allows to increase the transmission velocity or the capacity to
deliver voice and data tra¢ c. The investment cost function is quadratic:
Cq (g) =

2
g2: (7)
The second type is an investment to decrease the cost of providing the
services. Examples are the reduction in the costs of installing ADSL, which
usually requires a set of procedures, or the increase in the reliability of the
local network. Since the entrant uses the incumbents lines to supply the
services to its subscribers, it is the incumbent that supports all the operating
costs. Consequently, if the incumbent invests in cost reduction, the marginal
cost of supplying all consumers is reduced, no matter whether they are the
incumbents or the entrants. In this case, we assume that the innovation
represents a decrease of h in incumbents marginal cost, and the investment
cost function is also quadratic:
Cc (h) =

2
h2: (8)
Regulators decision
The regulator maximizes social welfare, which is given by the sum of
prots and consumer surplus:
W = I + E + CS: (9)
This is the traditional welfare measure adopted by industrial organization
theory. It can be argued that the regulator objective function should reect
the pressure su¤ered from the managers of rms they regulate by giving
4In these papers, an investment increases the willingness to pay for services, but the
dimension of the e¤ect depends on the ability of each operator to transform input to
output. Thus, we can have the incumbent o¤ering higher quality services, and vice-versa.
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more weight to rmssurplus. However, there are also theories which say
that as the regulator is indirectly chosen by the rms subscribers through
the government electoral process, he should give more weight to consumers
surplus. Hence, we decide to adopt a balanced assumption.5
In terms of the regulators decision timing, we will rst consider a context
where he sets the unbundling price at the beginning of the game, and commits
to it until the end, as in Cambini and Valletti (2004). Although this may seem
a strong assumption, it can be argued that the unbundling price set by the
regulator provides some commitment. To give an example, the regulator can
announce that it will set the unbundling price at a certain level for a certain
period, for instance until the next review. In this case this timing makes
sense: if the incumbent undertakes investments during the same period, it
will take as given the unbundling price set by the regulator. Valletti (2003)
argues that one of the main factors that must be taken into account on the
delineation of regulatory policies is the fact that regulators should be able to
commit to rules over a reasonable time period. Guthrie (2006) discusses the
constraints on the regulators actions adopted in several countries to prevent
him from acting opportunistically. For instance, in US the separation of
judiciary from government, the well-developed regulatory procedures, and
the Constitution combine to restrict opportunism.
Later, we will consider a context where the regulator does not commit,
and only takes the nal decision about the unbundling price after the invest-
ment stage, as in Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006). This may be due to
legal, political and/or practical constraints on the regulator.
Timing of the game
1. The regulator xes the unbundling price.
2. The incumbent decides how much to invest in its infrastructure.
3. The entrant decides if it asks for access.
4. Firms compete in prices.
When the regulator cannot commit to his decision the order of the rst
two moves is reversed.
We now nd the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium using backward induction.
5For a discussion about the regulators objectives see Guthrie (2006).
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3 Price competition stage
For given reservation prices (and therefore quality levels) and cost levels,
using demand functions (1) and (2), and maximizing prots with respect
to subscription price, we obtain the following Nash-equilibrium prices and
quantities of the price competition stage (see Appendix A):
pI   c  h = 1  
2   (x0 + g + h) +
3
4  2 (y0 + h) (10)
pE   r = 1  
2   (x0 + g + h)  2
1  2
4  2 (y0 + h) (11)
qI =
1
2  2 +  (x0 + g + h) 

4  2 (y0 + h) (12)
qE =
1
2  2 +  (x0 + g + h) 
2
4  2 (y0 + h) ; (13)
where x0 = a   c and y0 = r   c. Parameter y0 represents the incumbents
ex-ante access margin. It can also be interpreted as the entrants cost dis-
advantage, since the entrant has to pay r for each line while the incumbent
only incurs a cost of c. In the future we will work with y0 when we want to
nd the optimal unbundling price.
These equilibrium prices and quantities are only valid provided that the
entrant asks for access, which is true if qE  0; or:
y0  1
2
2 + 
1 + 
(x0 + g + h)  h: (14)
In this case, rmsprot and welfare are:
I (g; h; y0; ; ) =
1
(2  )2

1  
1 + 
(x0 + g + h)
2   8 + 
2
(2 + )2
(y0 + h)
2
+
4  2 + 2
2 + 
(x0 + g + h) (y0 + h)

  
2
g2   
2
h2 (15)
E (g; h; y0; ; ) =
1  
(2  )2

1
1 + 
(x0 + g + h)
2 + 4
1 + 
(2 + )2
(y0 + h)
2
  4
2 + 
(x0 + g + h) (y0 + h)

(16)
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W (g; h; y0; ; ) =
1
(2  )2

3  2
1 + 
(x0 + g + h)
2   1
2
4 + 52
(2 + )2
(y0 + h)
2
 1  
2
1 + 
(x0 + g + h) (y0 + h)

  
2
g2   
2
h2: (17)
Otherwise, we have monopoly and prot and welfare are:
MI (g; h; ; ) =
1
4
(x0 + g + h)
2   
2
g2   
2
h2 (18)
WM (g; h; ; ) =
1
2
(x0 + g + h)
2   
2
g2   
2
h2: (19)
4 Commitment to unbundling price before
investment
4.1 Investment stage
We will start to solve the incumbents investment problem about how much
to invest in quality upgrades and in cost reduction when the regulator acts
as a rst-mover, i.e. when the regulator can commit to the unbundling price
set prior to investments.
Since the main focus of our paper is to determine the relationship between
the unbundling price and investment, we only analyze here the investment
decision when entry occurs, since otherwise it is impossible to observe any
relationship. Besides, we will see in the next section that the socially optimal
unbundling price the regulator should set is such that entry occurs.
Proposition 1 When entry occurs, the investments in quality upgrades and
cost reduction are complements. Yet, the marginal prot of investing in qual-
ity upgrades (cost reduction) is increasing (decreasing) in the unbundling
price.
Proof. From the derivatives of (15) we easily nd that:
@2I
@g@h
> 0;
@2I
@g@y0
> 0;
@2I
@h@y0
< 0:
The higher is the investment in quality upgrades, the higher is the mar-
ginal benet of investing in cost reduction, since it decreases the cost of
serving a higher number of subscribers. Thus, investments are complements.
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With respect to the interactions between investments and the unbundling
price, they take place both on the wholesale and on the retail component of
the incumbents prot. The interactions on the retail prot have the same
signal for both investments. The higher is the unbundling price, the higher
is the incumbents subscription price, and thus the higher are the incentives
to increase its number of subscribers by investing in cost reduction and in
quality upgrades. However, the interactions on the wholesale component
have opposite signals. When the unbundling price is higher, the incumbent
earns more prot with the entrants subscribers. As a consequence, it has a
higher incentive to invest in quality upgrades since this increases the entrants
number of subscribers. On the other hand, it has less incentives to invest
in cost reduction since this decreases its rivals number of subscribers. This
follows from the fact that this investment only reduces incumbents cost per
line, while the entrants cost per line, which is given by r, remains the same.
Consequently, the incumbents cost advantage over its rival increases.
Hence, given that wholesale interactions are stronger than retail inter-
actions, we may observe each investment going in a di¤erent direction after
a change in the unbundling price, despite the complementarity between the
two investments.
If the regulator set an access margin instead of an unbundling price, so
that r decreased when c decreased, the investment in cost reduction would
be equivalent to an investment in quality upgrades, since there would not be
any gains in terms of cost advantage after an investment in cost reduction.
From the derivatives of the incumbents prot and welfare we also nd
that, whatever the unbundling price set by the regulator, the incumbent will
never invest e¢ ciently.
Proposition 2 For a given unbundling price, the incumbents investment is
sub-optimal from a social welfare point of view.
Proof. We nd that for any (g; h; y0) such that entry occurs:
@W
@h
  @I
@h
=
(1  ) (x0 + g + h) 
4  2 (1 + ) > 0
@W
@g
  @I
@g
=
2 (2 + ) (x0 + g + h) 
4  2 (1 + )   3 (1 + ) (y0 + h) 4  2 (1 + ) > 0:
Therefore, and given that both di¤erences are increasing on the other type
of investment, the incumbent will always invest less than socially optimal.
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Given the unbundling price set by the regulator (which we assume to be
such that entry is protable), the incumbent maximizes its prot function
(15) with respect to g and h. The prot-maximizing investments in quality
upgrades and in cost reduction are:
g (y0; ; ) =
 
8 + 3

(1 + )    (2 + )  6   + 2
V (; ; )
y0 (20)
+
 
6   + 2 (2 + ) + 2 (1  ) (2 + )2 
V (; ; )
x0
h (y0; ; ) =  
(1 + )
 
8 + 22   3  (2 + )  6   + 2
V (; ; )
y0 (21)
+
(2 + )
 
8  32 + 3
V (; ; )
x0;
where:
V (; ; ) = (1 + )
 
4  22    (2 + )  6   + 2 (22)
  2 (1  )  (2 + )2  +  4 + 4   3 :
We assume that, for any y0; the socially optimal quality upgrades and
cost reduction investments are nite, which is equivalent to:6
 >   6  4
4  32 + 3 (23)
 >   (1  )
 
12 + 8   2   23+  7 + 3 + 72 + 3
(2 + )2
 
(2  )2 (1 + )  (6  4) : (24)
If both these conditions hold, we have V (; ; ) > 0; and (h; g) maximize
prots in case entry occurs.7
Given that we will later consider an unregulated context, we further as-
sume that if the incumbent can additionally set the unbundling price, it will
invest a nite amount, which is equivalent to:8
 >   (2 + )
 
6   + 2
2 (1 + )
 
8 + 2

  (2 + )  6   + 2 : (25)
6These guarantee that the Hessian of a social planner who takes the decisions regarding
investments veries the second-order conditions for a maximum.
7These guarantee that the Hessian of the incumbents problem when entry occurs veri-
es the second-order conditions for a maximum. Yet, if we just impose (h; g) to be nite
the lower limits on  and  would be smaller.
8This toghether with (23) and (24) guarantee that the Hessian of an incumbent that
takes all decisions regarding investments and unbundling price veries the second-order
conditions for a maximum.
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We thus need to assure that:
 > min  max
n
; 
o
: (26)
However, for (20) and (21) to be the prot-maximizing investments we
need to have the entrant asking for access to the incumbents local loop. This
only happens if:
y0  1
2
2 + 
1 + 
(x0 + g
 (y0) + h (y0))  h (y0) ; (27)
or
y0  y0 (; ) 
(2  ) (2 + )2     4 + 2   32
2
 
4  2 (1 + )   (2 + ) (4  )     4 + 2   32x0;
(28)
which is positive for  > min and  > :
Note that (20) and (21) only hold if h  c: When r is low enough, we
may have h > c; which is equivalent to:
r < r  (2 + )
 
8  32 + 3
(1 + )
 
8 + 22   3  (2 + )  6   + 2a
  (2 + )
2  (1 + ) (2  )2   2 (1  ) 
(1 + )
 
8 + 22   3  (2 + )  6   + 2c: (29)
In this case the best the incumbent can do is to invest h = c; and the
prot-maximizing investment in quality upgrades becomes:
g (y0; ; ) =
2 (1  )
(1 + ) (2  )2   2 (1  ) (x0 + c) (30)
+
(1 + )
 
4  2 + 2 
(1 + ) (2  )2   2 (1  ) (2 + ) (y0 + c) :
Having found the equilibrium investments in quality upgrades and in
cost reduction when entry occurs, we are now able to determine the e¤ect of
unbundling on each type of investment.
Proposition 3 When entry occurs, and for r  r, the prot-maximizing
investment in cost reduction is decreasing in the unbundling price.
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Proof. Taking the derivative of h with respect to r, we obtain:
@h
@r
=
@h
@y0
@y0
@r
=  (1 + )
 
8 + 22   3  (2 + )  6   + 2
V (; ; )
;
which is always negative for  >  and  > min.
Proposition 4 Let e  172+50 172+163 84+25+6
(1+)(48+24 162 23 34+45 6) and
e  6 +2
(1+)(4 2+2) :
When entry occurs, and for r  r, the prot-maximizing investment in qual-
ity upgrades is increasing in the unbundling price if   e; or if  > e and
 > e: For  > e it is decreasing if  2 min; e :
Proof. Taking the derivative of g with respect to r, we obtain:
@g
@r
=
@g
@y0
@y0
@r
=
 
8 + 3

(1 + )    (2 + )  6   + 2
V (; ; )
;
which is positive for  > e and negative for  < e: Then, comparing e with
min; we always have e >  , but e >  if and only if  > e: Hence for
  e; we have e  min:
As we have seen in Proposition 1, the higher is the unbundling price, the
lower is the marginal prot of investing in cost reduction. Thus, as expected,
we have a lower equilibrium investment in cost reduction.
In contrast, the e¤ect of the unbundling price in equilibrium quality im-
provements does not follow immediately from Proposition 1, as only for a
low  or a high  we obtain a positive relationship. This results from the
complementarity between the two investments. Indeed, if we take into ac-
count the indirect e¤ect of a higher unbundling price through cost reduction,
we observe that this has a negative impact on the marginal prot of quality
improvements. Consequently, when this indirect e¤ect is relatively stronger,
we obtain a negative relationship between investment in quality upgrades
and the unbundling price. This happens for a low ; i.e. when the reaction
of cost reduction to an increase in the unbundling price is high.
The same indirect e¤ect is present in the cost reduction equilibrium in-
vestment, but in this case the e¤ect is weaker for all  > , and consequently,
we always obtain a negative relationship. This follows from the fact that the
marginal prot of cost reduction reacts more to changes in r than the mar-
ginal prot of quality improvements.
For r < r; cost reduction is independent of the unbundling price, while
quality improvement is always increasing in r, since the indirect e¤ect does
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not exist. However, for the rest of the paper, we will assume that c is su¢ -
ciently high so that the lower limit r is never binding. In this case, we have
(20) and (21) as the investment choices of the incumbent when entry occurs.
Proposition 5 Let   8+22 3
8+3
: When entry occurs, and r  r, if 

> ;
the prot-maximizing total investment is increasing in the unbundling price
and if 

< ; it is decreasing.
Proof. Summing g and h, and then taking the derivative with respect
to r, we obtain:
@ (h + g)
@y0
@y0
@r
= (1 + )
 
8 + 3

    8 + 22   3
V (; ; )
;
and thus @(h
+g)
@r
> 0 if and only if  > 8+2
2 3
8+3
:
This result constitutes the main novelty of our paper, and helps to explain
the discussed controversy about the relationship between the incumbents in-
vestment and unbundling. According to this, if cost reduction is su¢ ciently
expensive as compared with quality improvements, the higher is the un-
bundling price, the higher is the total amount of investment we expect the
incumbent to do. Otherwise, we expect total investment to be lower when
the unbundling price is higher.
The existent empirical studies do not distinguish between these two types
of investment. By this way, it is natural that we observe some contradictory
results. In fact, if 

> , a more intense utilization generated by a lower
unbundling price leads an incumbent to invest less. Therefore, we expect
to see more investment when the unbundling price is higher, which conrms
the results of Haring et al. (2002), Hausman and Sidak (2005), and Gabel
and Huang (2003). If 

< ; we obtain a negative relationship between
investment and unbundling price, which is according to the result by Willig
et al. (2002), Hassett et al. (2003), and the Phoenix Center Studies (2003a,
2003b), which state that a lower unbundling price increases the intensity of
competition, and this increases the incentives of an incumbent to invest in
order to gain a competitive advantage.
Note that  > 1 for  2 (0; 1), i.e. we can have  >  and even so the
relationship is negative. This is a consequence of the stronger direct e¤ect of
a higher unbundling price on cost reduction.
4.2 Regulation stage
After having determined the relationship between the incumbents invest-
ment and unbundling in a context where the regulator is able to commit, we
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will now nd the unbundling price the regulator should set ex ante.
Let us rst consider the absence of an investment stage. In this case,
the regulator maximizes social welfare over r without having to take into
account the incumbents investment incentives. Yet, he must consider that
the incumbent cannot earn negative prots.
Proposition 6 In the absence of an investment stage, the second-best so-
cially optimal unbundling price is such that the incumbent earns zero prots
and entry occurs.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is socially optimal to have the incumbent subsidizing the entrants
activity through a negative access margin. In fact, when the unbundling
price is lower than marginal cost, competition between operators is more
intense. The incumbent wants the entrant to have fewer subscribers in order
to lose less money with unbundled lines, and the entrant wants to have
more subscribers because prot per subscriber is higher. As a result, the
subscription price of both operators decreases, increasing social welfare.
When there is an investment stage and the regulator is able to commit to
the unbundling price before investment, the regulator must take into account
how the incumbent will invest given the unbundling price set ex ante. Again,
he must consider that the incumbents net prot at the prot-maximizing
investment levels cannot be negative, i.e.
I (y0; ; ) = I (g
 (y0; ; ) ; h (y0; ; ) ; y0; ; )  0: (31)
First we observe that the regulator should promote service-based compe-
tition since the entry of a second operator has a strong e¤ect on attracting
more consumers to the market, which increases welfare. Therefore, he should
set an unbundling price such that entry occurs.
The unbundling price should then be used for three objectives: to increase
the intensity of competition, to give incentives for an investment in cost
reduction and to give incentives for an investment in quality upgrades. When
 > e and  < e the three objectives are all favored by a low r, and
therefore the rst-best unbundling price (yc10 ) is so low that the incumbent
would earn negative prots net of investment. In this case, the second-
best unbundling price (yc20 ) that the regulator should set is such that the
incumbent earns zero prots. Only for   e quality improvements become
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increasing in r; and the regulator has incentives to set a higher r. However,
if  is lower than a threshold  () > e; the rst-best unbundling price is
still such that the incumbent would earn negative prots net of investment.
Therefore, the regulator should still set a second-best unbundling price. Only
when  >  () ; quality improvements gain enough weight relatively to cost
reduction in the regulators objective function, so that yc10 is su¢ ciently high
to allow the incumbent to earn positive prots, and can thus be implemented
by the regulator. If  is very high, then yc10 can never be implemented.
This can be summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Dene  as the lowest  such that
I
 
yc10 (; ) ; ; 
  0; 8 > min;
and  () by I
 
yc10 (; ) ; ; 

= 0 for  < : When the regulator sets
the unbundling price before investment, at the socially optimal unbundling
price entry occurs, and the incumbent earns zero prots (net of investment)
if   ; or if  <  and    (), and positive prots (net of investment)
if  <  and  >  ().
Proof. See Appendix C.
The socially optimal unbundling price induces the incumbent to invest
more on the type of investment which has the lower cost. Even when the
unbundling price is such that the incumbent earns zero prots, it invests,
since otherwise it would earn negative prots.
5 No commitment to unbundling price before
investment
In the previous section we have solved the regulators and rmsproblem
when the regulator acts as a rst-mover and sets the unbundling price before
the incumbent invests. This commitment may, however, not be credible
if the regulator can change price at will later on. In this case, he has all
the incentives to revise his decision after observing the investment made by
the incumbent, as in Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006). Knowing this,
the incumbent takes into account how the regulator will change his decision
about the unbundling price when it invests.
We start by solving the regulators problem. Given the value of g and
h chosen by the incumbent in the rst stage, the regulator maximizes social
welfare with respect to r:
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Proposition 8 When the regulator sets the unbundling price after the in-
vestment decision, it is such that the incumbent earns zero prots (gross of
investment), and entry occurs.
Proof. Given that the regulator takes his decision after investment,
investment costs are already a sunk cost. Hence, the regulators decision is
similar to the no-investment benchmark.
Corollary 9 The incumbent does not invest in its network if the regulator
only sets the unbundling price ex post. Therefore, welfare is lower as com-
pared with the commitment context.
Proof. The rst part of the Proposition follows from Proposition 8, since
if the incumbent invests it will earn negative net prots. The access margin
set by the regulator is then the same as in the no-investment benchmark,
and social welfare is W nc = W ni; as dened in Appendix B. Finally, one can
prove that W nc < W c (; ) ; as dened in Appendix C for all  >  and
 > min. In fact, under commitment the regulator could set this unbundling
price, and we would still have investment.
When the regulator acts as a second-mover, he only cares for low equilib-
rium prices, which are favoured by a low unbundling price. The incumbent
foresees this behavior by the regulator, and thus it does not invest. In fact, if
the incumbent invests, it will earn negative prots net of investment, because
when the regulator sets the nal unbundling price he treats investment costs
as sunk costs.9
Note that, in this case, we cannot observe any relationship between the
unbundling price and investment. What we observe is that under unbundling
there is no investment.
If a regulator cannot commit to his decisions, unbundling policies a¤ect
welfare negatively. This result supports the criticisms of service-based com-
petition, namely of its impact on dynamic e¢ ciency. Indeed, if a regulator is
implementing an unbundling policy he must show to the market participants
that he has the ability to commit to his decisions. If he cannot commit, it
may be better to leave the market unregulated as we will see next.
9In Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006) instead of a zero prot restriction on the in-
cumbents prot, its is assumed that the access margin cannot be negative. Hence, the
incumbent invests since it is able to retain part of the gains from its investment.
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6 Unregulated market
When there is no mandatory unbundling, the incumbent takes all decisions
regarding investment and unbundling price. In this case, a high r is equivalent
to no unbundling.
As we have a simultaneous decision over (r; g; h) ; by the envelope theo-
rem, we just need to substitute the optimal investment functions g (y0; ; )
and h (y0; ; ) into the incumbents prot function, and then maximize it
with respect to r. The prot-maximizing ex-ante access margin becomes:
yur0 = (2 + )
(1 + )
 
4  2 + 2     6   + 2
T (; ; )
x0; (32)
where
T (; ; ) = 2 (1 + )
 
8 + 2

  (2 + )  6   + 2 ( + ) ; (33)
which is positive for  > min: Then, substituting y
ur
0 into g
 (y0; ; ) and
h (y0; ; ), we nd the prot-maximizing investments:
gur =
(2 + )
 
6   + 2 
T (; ; )
x0 (34)
hur =
(2 + )
 
6   + 2
T (; ; )
x0: (35)
Proposition 10 The incumbent prefers to rent out its loops to remaining a
monopolist.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The incumbent unbundles its network in order to attract more consumers
to the market. Then, it sets a high unbundling price to absorb part of the
prot the entrant earns with these new subscribers, increasing its own prot.
There are some cases where incumbents have voluntarily entered into
agreements with entrants for unbundled access, take the example of Verizon
and Covad in the US.
Proposition 11 The prot-maximizing unbundling price is higher than the
socially optimal one in a commitment context. Therefore, for  > e and
 < e the incumbent invests less in both types of investment in an unregu-
lated market, while otherwise it invests more in quality upgrades and less in
cost reduction. Social welfare is always lower as compared to a commitment
context.
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Proof. One can prove that, for  >  and  > min; we have yur0 (; ) >
yc0 (; ) as dened in Appendix C: The second part then follows from Propo-
sitions 3 and 4. As for the welfare result, we just need to observe that the
regulator could always have chosen yur0 (; ) when he set the socially optimal
unbundling price.
Proposition 12 Denote W ur (; ) as welfare at (yur; gur; hur), and dene
 as the highest  such that W ur (; )  W nc for every  > min; and
 () as the highest  such that W ur (; ) = W nc for  > . The prot-
maximizing unbundling price is higher than the socially optimal one in the
no-commitment context, and the incumbent invests more in both types of in-
vestment. Social welfare is higher as compared to the no-commitment context
if  < ; or if  >  and  <  () : For  > ; it is lower if  >  () :
Proof. See Appendix E.
If the regulator can commit to his decisions, social welfare is higher when
he intervenes in the market ex ante as compared to no intervention since the
unbundling price the incumbent would set is too high as compared to the one
set by the regulator. Hence, in this case, it is better to have the regulator
intervening.
On the other hand, if we compare the unregulated market with the context
where the regulator cannot commit, the prot-maximizing unbundling price
is still higher, but the incumbents investments are also higher, similarly to
Kotakorpi (2006). Therefore, when investment costs are low, it is preferable
to leave the market unregulated since the incumbent unbundles and invests,
while with ex-post regulation we obtain a zero investment. For  >  () and
   the investments made by the unregulated incumbent are lower, and
thus regulation ex post becomes preferable since it assures low subscription
prices.
7 Extensions
7.1 Imperfect commitment to unbundling price
Although we just analyze the cases of perfect commitment and no commit-
ment, we could also have considered a context where the regulator could only
stick to the unbundling price set ex ante with probability , and changed it
ex post with probability 1   : This, besides embracing our two extreme
scenarios, would also include intermediate cases of imperfect commitment.10
10I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Given that the regulator considers investment costs as sunk costs when he
does not commit to the unbundling price, he sets r at a value such that the
incumbent earns negative prots net of investment, as in Section 5. Hence,
with imperfect commitment, the incumbents expected prot would be:
I (g; h; y0; ; ; ) = I (g; h; y0; ; ) + (1  )

 
2
g2   
2
h2

=

(2  )2

1  
1 + 
(x0 + g + h)
2   8 + 
2
(2 + )2
(y0 + h)
2
+
4  2 + 2
2 + 
(x0 + g + h) (y0 + h)

  
2
g2   
2
h2:
and therefore its maximization problem would become:
max
g;h
I (g; h; y0; ; ; ) : (36)
The results of the investment stage would come very similar to the com-
mitment case since the incumbent would still have some investment incen-
tives, although weaker than under perfect commitment. In fact, we have:
@2I
@g@
> 0;
@2I
@h@
> 0; (37)
i.e. investment incentives are increasing in ; meaning that the incumbent
invests more the higher the regulators commitment ability, since it can retain
the gains from its investment more often.
When setting the unbundling price ex ante, the regulator should take
I (g; h; y0; ; ; ) into account for the restriction on the incumbents prot,
which means that if he wants the incumbent to invest he should leave it with
positive prots for the state where the unbundling price remains stick, to
compensate the negative prots when he changes it. Welfare would obviously
be increasing in .
7.2 Mature markets
In this section we analyze the case of mature markets. This is important
because it is another factor that can help to justify the contradictory empir-
ical results about the e¤ect of unbundling on incumbents investment, since
depending on the market coverage the relationship may di¤er.
In mature markets, we usually have full consumer participation, which
means that total demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to price changes.
A relevant example is xed telephony.
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De Bijl and Peitz (2004) show that, contrary to the context of partial
consumer participation, an increase in the unbundling price is totally passed
on by the entrant to consumers. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) show that this
is only true when the marginal consumer obtains positive surplus, which
happens for low values of r.
Bourreau and Dogan (2005) use a Hotelling model to formalize a mature
market, where, in equilibrium, each operator is located at one of the extremes
of the line. In their model the incumbents prot and social welfare are given
by:
I =
8<:
1
2
+ r   c if r 2 0; a  5
4

1
2
 
a  1
4
+ r
  c if r 2 a  5
4
; a  3
4

r   1 +p3pa  r   2
p
3
9
(a  r) 32   c if r 2 a  3
4
; a
 ;
(38)
and
W =

a  1
12
  c if r 2 0; a  3
4

2
3
a+ 1
3
r   1
3
  c+
p
3
3
p
a  r if r 2 a  3
4
; a
 ; (39)
where a > 3 is the xed utility of consumption.11
Let us rst consider an investment in quality. As in previous sections
this investment increases the reservation price a. In this case, when the
unbundling price is low (r < a  5
4
) the incumbent has no incentive to invest
since the increase in quality is totally passed on to consumers as prices remain
stick. For intermediate values of r the incumbent invests in quality upgrades
because this increases the valuation of the marginal consumer, allowing rms
to increase prices. For high values of r the incumbent invests even more, and
the investment is increasing in r. In fact, as for r > a  3
4
the entrants market
share increases when the incumbent invests, the higher is r the higher is the
incentive to invest.
As concerns cost reduction, the incumbent always invests, but the size
of the investment is independent of the unbundling price. This is because
the number of subscribers is xed, and translates into the lack of interaction
between r and c in I :
We can then conclude that for a full consumer participation model total
investment depends positively on the unbundling price for a su¢ ciently high
unbundling price.
11In this model it is assumed that consumers face a transportation cost equal to 1.
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8 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper is to clarify the contradictory results in
the empirical literature about the e¤ects of unbundling on incumbent rms
investment. We develop a model with two telecommunications operators, an
incumbent and an entrant, that o¤er di¤erentiated services in a market with
partial consumer participation. The incumbent can invest in quality upgrades
and in cost reduction, which are complements but have di¤erent impacts on
both rms. We conclude that both empirically observed relationships are
possible. In fact, in a context where the regulator sets the unbundling price
before investment, a low unbundling price increases the intensity of compe-
tition, which gives incentives for an incumbent to invest in cost reduction in
order to gain a cost advantage for a given unbundling price. On the other
hand, it decreases the incumbents return from investing in quality upgrades.
Thus, although one should expect to have both investments moving together
due to their complementarity, it is not obvious what the equilibrium e¤ect
of a lower unbundling price on total investment will be.
We then compare social welfare when the regulator can commit to an
unbundling price set ex ante and when he cannot. We show that in the latter
case the incumbent does not invest since it does not retain any gain from its
investments. As a consequence, social welfare is lower. Here, it may be better
to leave the market unregulated since the incumbent rm will unbundle its
local loop and invest. Thus, for the welfare e¤ects of unbundling policies it
is decisive whether the regulator can or cannot commit to unbundling prices.
Finally, we show that in case of imperfect commitment by the regulator
the relationship between the unbundling price and incumbents investment
remains similar to the commitment case, while with mature markets it is
positive for a su¢ ciently high unbundling price.
Appendix A
Given demand functions (1) and (2), the incumbents and entrants prot
functions become:
I =

a (1  )  pI + pE
1  2

(pI   c) +

a (1  )  pE + pI
1  2

(r   c)
E = (pE   r)

a (1  )  pE + pI
1  2

:
23
If we maximize each prot function with respect to the price of the respective
operator, we obtain the following best response functions:
pI =
1
2
(a+ c) (1  ) + 1
2
pE +
1
2
r
pE =
1
2
a (1  ) + 1
2
pI +
1
2
r:
Solving these, equilibrium prices become:
pI =
1  
2   (a  c) +
3
4  2 (r   c) + c
pE =
1  
2   (a  c)  2
1  2
4  2 (r   c) + r:
Substituting both in (1) and (2) we nd equilibrium quantities:
qI =
1
2  2 +  (a  c) 

4  2 (r   c)
qE =
1
2  2 +  (a  c) 
2
4  2 (r   c) :
Therefore, equilibrium prots and welfare are:
I =
1  
(1 + ) (2  )2 (a  c)
2   8 + 
2 
4  22 (r   c)2
+
4  2 + 2
(2  )  4  2 (a  c) (r   c)
E =
1  
(1 + ) (2  )2 (a  c)
2 +
4
 
1  2 
4  22 (r   c)2
  4 (1  )
(2  )2 (2 + ) (a  c) (r   c)
W =
3  2
(1 + ) (2  )2 (a  c)
2   4 + 5
2
2
 
4  22 (r   c)2
  1  
(2  )2 (a  c) (r   c) :
Finally, when we introduce the two investments into the equilibrium we
obtain a+ g instead of a; and c  h instead of c. We also have to introduce
the investment cost functions (7) and (8) into welfare and incumbents prot.
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Appendix B - Proof of Proposition 6
The regulator maximizes social welfare subject to the non-negativity con-
dition in the incumbents prot. Thus, we have the following Lagrangian:
$ = W (y0; ; ) + 1I (y0; ; ) :
First-order conditions are:
 2(1  ) (2 + )
2 x0 +
 
4 + 52

y0 
4  22 + 1
 
8 + 3

x0   2y0
 
8 + 2
 
4  22 = 0
(40)
I (y0; ; )  0 ; 1  0 ; I (y0; ; )1 = 0:
If 1 = 0, we obtain:
y0 =  (1  ) (2 + )
2
4 + 52
x0;
but this violates I (y0; ; )  0 restriction.
If 1 > 0, we obtain I (y0; ; ) = 0; and thus (40) becomes:
1 = 2
x0 (1  ) (2 + )2 +
 
4 + 52

y0 
8 + 3

x0   2y0
 
8 + 2
 > 0:
Therefore, in the absence of investment, the socially optimal access margin
is.
yni0 = (2 + )
(1 + )
 
4  2 + 2  (2  )q(2 + ) (1 + )  6   + 2
2 (1 + )
 
8 + 2
 x0:
(41)
Finally, we verify that the entrant asks for access since yni0 <
1
2
2+
1+
x0; and
that social welfare:
W ni =
  
128 + 16 + 222   43 + 34   35
4 (1 + )
 
8 + 2
2
+
 
24 + 62   33q(2 + ) (1 + )  6   + 2
4 (1 + )
 
8 + 2
2
1Ax20;
is higher than WM = 1
2
x0
2.
Appendix C - Proof of Proposition 7
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First, we substitute the prot-maximizing investments (20) and (21) into
the welfare function (17) and then maximize it with respect to y0:We obtain
the rst-best access margin yc10 = Z (; ; )x0; where Z (; ; ) is an non-
linear function.
Introducing yc10 (; ) into (31), we nd that:
I
 
yc10 (; ); 
  0;
if and only if    () and   : Thus, for    () and   ; it
is possible to implement yc10 (; ). However, if  > ; or if    and
 <  ():
I
 
yc10 (; ) ; ; 

< 0;
and therefore, the regulator can only implement the second-best ex-ante ac-
cess margin which is obtained by solving I (y
c2
0 ; ; ) = 0. From this we
obtain yc20 = L (; ; )x0; where L (; ; ) is also a non-linear function.
Next we verify that yc0 (; ) < y0 (; ) holds for  >  and  > min,
where yc0 (; ) = max fyc10 (; ) ; yc20 (; )g : Thus, if entry is suppose to
occur, the socially optimal ex-ante access margin is yc0 (; ) and welfare is
W c (; ) :
Finally, we need to check if the regulator does not prefer a monopoly
context. A monopolist incumbent solves the following problem:
max
g;h
1
4
(x0 + h+ g)
2   
2
g2   
2
h2;
which gives optimal investments under monopoly:
gM =

2     x0; h
M =

2     x0:
Substituting in (19), welfare under monopoly becomes:
WM (; ) =
1
2
 (3     )
(2     )2 x
2
0:
One can prove that W c (; ) > WM (; ) for  >  and  > min; and
therefore yc0 (; ) is the socially optimal unbundling price.
Omitted calculations are available from author.
Appendix D - Proof of Proposition 10
After tedious calculation one can prove that yur0 (; ) < y0 (; ) for
 >  and  > min; and thus the entrant asks for access. We can then
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introduce yur, gur and hur into the incumbents prot function and obtain:
urI (; ) =
(2 + )
 
6   + 2
2T (; ; )
x20:
Given
 
gM ; hM

nd in Appendix C, the incumbents monopoly prot is:
MI (; ) =
1
2


2     

x20:
Comparing it with prot under unbundling, we nd that urI (; ) 
MI (; ), for  >  and  > min:
Appendix E - Proof of Proposition 12
If we substitute (32), (34), (35) into (17), we obtain welfare in an unreg-
ulated market:
W ur (; ) =
 
(1 + )
 
304 + 48 + 1082 + 163 + 114   5 
T (; ; )2
 ( + ) (2 + )
2  6   + 22
T (; ; )2
!
1
2
x20:
Comparing with welfare in the no-commitment context, we nd that if
 < , then W ur (; ) > W nc for every  > min: If  > 
, then
W ur (; ) > W nc only if  2 ( () ;  ()) : One can show that for
 > ; we have  () > min > 
 () (calculations are available from
author).
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